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The computer's ability to perform repetitive calculations at high
speed is well known. Computer simulations use this repetitive
number crunching power, together with a set of scientific formulas, to
analyze real world events.' In addition to this number-crunching
power, flat screen computer displays can produce sophisticated illus-
trations that accurately represent three-dimensional objects.'
Advancing technology has made the combination of the com-
puter's number-crunching and illustrative capabilities economically
feasible. By displaying sequences of these images, and by varying
each image according to formulas, the computer can produce a
"movie."3 These animated images, called computer re-enactments,4
are now used in litigation covering a wide range of subjects such as
automotive, airplane, marine and construction accidents.5
The advantage of computer re-enactment in litigation is its ability
to recreate an event even if no camera could have captured what was
most important to record. The danger with re-enactments is that they
can give the impression that a computer actually did capture what a
camera did not. The television viewing habits in the United States
make this danger even more severe: An average person in the United
States watches seven hours of television per day.6 People who are
accustomed to this amount of "visual learning" tend to believe what
they see on a television screen.7
This Note discusses disclosure, during the pretrial discovery pro-
cess, of computer re-enactments and their underlying facts and as-
1. See Alan Aldous, Note, Disclosure of Expert Computer Simulations, 8 COMPUTER/
L.J. 51 (1987).
2. See David Muir, Computer Animation: Debunking the Myths, in WINNING WITH
COMPUTERS: TRIAL PRACTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 363, 364 (John C. Treden-
nick, Jr. & James A. Eidelman eds., 1991) [hereinafter Winning with Computers].
3. Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, Demonstrative Evidence in the Twenty-
First Century: How to Get It Admitted, in WINNING WITH COMPUTERS, supra note 2, at 369,
371.
4. There is some confusion over the term used to describe animated computer graph-
ics used as evidence. See Kathlynn G. Fadely, Use of Computer-Generated Visual Evidence
in Aviation Litigation: Interactive Video Comes to Court, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 839, 842
(1990). "Computer re-enactment," as used herein, is a shortened version of computer-
generated re-enactment. See Barry Sullivan, Computer-Generated Re-enactments as Evi-
dence in Accident Cases, 3 HIGH TECH. L.J. 193 (1988).
5. Muir, supra note 2, at 364.
6. See Robert F. Seltzer, Using Computer-Animated Evidence in the Courtroom, in
WINNING WITH COMPUTERS, supra note 2, at 361; Eli Chernow, Video in the Courtroom:
More Than a Talking Head, 15 LITIGATION 3 (Fall 1988).
7. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 195..
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sumptions. This aspect of disclosure directly affects the opposing
party's ability to effectively "cross-examine" the computer. A mere
visual review of a computer re-enactment on a video monitor does not
allow for effective cross-examination, because the key to cross-exam-
ining any computer evidence, particularly a computer re-enactment, is
knowing the details of the underlying computations. Courts must re-
solve several central issues to determine the extent of disclosure re-
quired before allowing a party to use a computer re-enactment at trial.
Commentators8 and the courts are beginning to face discovery
issues related to computer re-enactments. The issue most developed
by the courts concerns when disclosure of a computer re-enactment
must take place.9 In contrast, this Note concentrates on what must be
disclosed to the opposing party. It argues that a careful application of
the discovery process, together with an understanding of the technol-
ogy involved, can enable the opponent of a computer re-enactment to
rebut effectively any hidden bias in a computer re-enactment.
Several assumptions narrow the scope of this Note. First, it ana-
lyzes only the rules of the federal civil courts, although computer re-
enactments are used in both criminal and civil litigation at both the
federal and state levels.1 ° Further, this Note is limited to computer re-
enactments used in connection with the testimony of an expert wit-
ness, though in practice they may also be used with an eyewitness.11
Finally, this Note assures that computer re-enactment images gener-
ally use three-dimensional surfaced graphics, as opposed to simple
wireframe computer drawings.
Part I provides background information on computer re-enact-
ments and their uses in court, and briefly addresses the current state
of the technology and its potential impact on discovery. Part II re-
views the limited case law on discovery of computer re-enactments,
discussing the two distinct trends in discovery of other forms of com-
puter evidence: first, the broad discovery allowed for computer simu-
lations; and second, the protection from discovery of computer
litigation support systems. It then explains these trends by analysis of
8. See Brain & Broderick, supra note 3; Fadely, supra note 4; Sullivan, supra note 4;
Chernow, supra note 6; Craig Murphy, Comment, Computer Simulations and Video Re-
Enactments: Fact, Fantasy and Admission Standards, 17 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 145 (1990).
9. People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1984) (re-enactment of car crash admissible
provided counsel lays proper groundwork and qualifies the expert.who prepared the re-
enactment); Baugh v. Gulf Air Transp., Inc., 526 So. 2d 1239 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1988) (failure
of counsel to request a proffer at trial regarding the nature and use of the computer re-
enactment did not preserve the excluded evidence for appeal); Douglass v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., .709 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
10. See, e.g., McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721; Douglass, 709 F. Supp. 745.
11. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 196.
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the federal rules applicable to discovery of computer evidence, and
draws an analogy to discovery of videotaped re-enactments. Finally,




The importance of demonstrative evidence in trials has increased
tremendously since the 1950's.12 Litigators have created new forms of
demonstrative evidence as technology has progressed. First, three di-
mensional models and sophisticated diagrams replaced hand-drawn
sketches and charts. 3 Later, color transparent overlays came into use.
Now, videotape technology in the courtroom is commonplace.14 The
recent advent of affordable and powerful computers has led to yet
another form of demonstrative evidence: the computer re-
enactment. 5
A computer re-enactment is a series of graphical images shown in
sequence, created with the aid of a computer, which reconstruct a vis-
ual representation of an event. 6 A comparison with a movie film
helps to clarify this definition: A movie is actually a series of photo-
graphs in which each photograph varies slightly from the last. The
image of motion results from viewing the photographs in sequence, at
a high rate of speed.
A computer, on the other hand, produces the graphical images of
a computer re-enactment. 17 Each image represents objects at a cer-
tain moment in time, analogous to the individual photographs in a
movie. These computer images also vary, one from the next, so that
when viewed in sequence the object appears to be in motion. 8
The computer-generated images are not, however, photographs.
Computer re-enactments instead use a wide range of visual images
which can represent an event with varying degrees of realism. "They
can generate objects which are two or three-dimensional, black-and-
white, colored, stick figured, or carefully shaded 'solids.""' 9 Although
the resulting re-enactments may be vastly different in appearance, any
12. Brain & Broderick, supra note 3, at 370.
13. Brain & Broderick, supra note 3, at 370.
14. Brain & Broderick, supra note 3, at 370.
15. Brain & Broderick, supra note 3, at 370.
16. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 194.
17. Muir, supra note 2, at 364.
18. Muir, supra note 2, at 364.
19. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 194.
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of these graphical options can produce fair and accurate portrayals of
an event. The cost, visual effectiveness, and impact on the jury of the
computer re-enactment, however, may vary considerably with the
type of graphics displayed.2 °
Unlike the choice of graphics, the factual and scientific bases of a
computer re-enactment are not readily visible. As noted, the com-
puter-generated images are intended to represent physical objects in
motion. The accuracy of representation can vary widely.21 A com-
puter re-enactment can display "an almost eerie reality. However
wrong that reality may be, the danger exists that a jury will accept it
unquestioningly. '22 Thus, a critical distinction has been drawn be-
tween computer re-enactments which are solidly based on investiga-
tion and science, and computer re-enactments which are artistic
distortions.23
The influence that a biased re-enactment can have on viewers has
been a source of concern.24 The potential danger of artistic distortions
has been summed up by the following question: "How can subliminal
emotional land mines.., be detected? '25 Commentators dealing with
computer re-enactments previously have analyzed this concern under
the rules of evidence.26 This analysis leads to an "in-or-out" result:
Evidence is either admitted for use in the court or it is ruled inadmissi-
ble. The goal of such an analysis is to exclude computer re-enact-
ments (or portions thereof) that are unnecessarily suggestive, while
admitting into evidence re-enactments which are within acceptable
limits. 27 The factual basis underlying computer re-enactments, for ex-
ample, has been measured using this in-or-out approach.28
The factual depth of a computer re-enactment may vary widely.
On the superficial extreme, with minimal factual basis, "a computer
animator individually designs each image, using the computer merely
as an animation 'canvas."' 29 Such illustrative computer re-enactments
20. Muir, supra note 2, at 368 (while two-dimensional animations portraying simple
motions can be produced in a few days for approximately $6,000, a complex re-enactment
of an airplane crash can take months to complete and can cost hundreds of thousands of
dollars).
21. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 195.
22. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 195.
23. See Chernow, supra note 6, at 5-6.
24. See Chernow, supra note 6, at 5-6.
25. Chernow, supra note 6, at 5.
26. See, e.g., Muir, supra note 2, at 367; Sullivan, supra note 4, at 202-04.
27. Muir, supra note 2, at 367-68.
28. Brain & Broderick, supra note 3, at 370-71; see also Fadely, supra note 4, at 842.
29. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 194.
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have aptly been called computer animations.3" Such animations are
less likely to be admissible.
At the other extreme, "known parameters, data, and facts de-
rived from [an] ... investigation are entered into a computer. Based
on this input, the computer may be able to supply missing informa-
tion."31 Re-enactments with such factual foundations are called re-
constructions. "A computer-generated ... reconstruction ... is an
explanation of what in fact happened."32
The distinction between animations and reconstructions is valid
and helps determine whether to admit computer re-enactments as evi-
dence in a courtroom. However, a black-or-white approach is not al-
ways the best method to analyze a world with many shades of grey.
Most often re-enactments prepared for litigation and admitted for use
in a courtroom will fall between these two theoretical extremes, be-
cause creation of an animation that is relevant to a case requires some
investigation and factual basis. On the other hand, even the most fac-
tually based reconstruction created for litigation will highlight those
facts most favorable to the side offering the computer re-enactment as
evidence. A computer re-enactment's location along this "anima-
tion-reconstruction spectrum" is thus one indication of whether the
computer re-enactment should be admitted.
The decision to admit a computer re-enactment as evidence does
not end concern for bias. "Of course, it is naive to assume that [com-
puter re-enactments] which survive the analysis ... would be perfectly
non-partisan. '33 Therefore, once a court admits the re-enactment as
evidence, some procedure is required to bring out any remaining un-
founded or prejudicial aspects of the computer re-enactment for the
court to accomplish its truth-finding function.
The adversarial system places the burden on the opposing party
to contradict the unfounded or prejudicial aspects of admitted evi-
dence. 34 Cross-examination is one method available to the opponent
of a computer re-enactment to expose any artistic distortions. How-
ever, to allow for effective cross-examination, the court first must
place the required information in the opponent's hands. Pretrial dis-
covery should be the process by which the opponent to a computer re-
30. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 194. Animations are admissible generally to illustrate
expert testimony. Brain & Broderick, supra note 3, at 371.
31. Fadely, supra note 4, at 843.
32. Fadely, supra note 4, at 842.
33. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 240.
34. See generally GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 4-
5 (2d ed. 1987).
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enactment can gain the information necessary to prepare an effective
cross-examination.
A. Examples of Uses of Computer Re-enactments
Perhaps the most famous computer re-enactment used in a civil
case explained a highly technical process involving a massive hexane
explosion in the Louisville, Kentucky sewer system.35 The use of the
computer re-enactment led to a quick settlement. A chemical engi-
neer had determined that modifications and lack of maintenance at a
Ralston Purina plant resulted in the explosion. The "problem was
that it took the engineer days to explain his theory. And unless you,
too, were a chemical engineer, you couldn't understand him."36 Using
computer animation, the expert's conclusions were reduced to a 12-
minute videotape. Immediately after viewing the video, Ralston
Purina settled for more than $65 million.37 Many have called this ani-
mation the "Citizen Kane" of animated computer re-enactments.3 8
Re-enactments are also effective in aircraft accident litigation.
Aircraft accident computer re-enactments have an unusually complete
set of data available, which allow creation of very accurate reconstruc-
tions. For example:
By using the digital flight data recorder information from the air-
craft, a computer [re-enactment] was developed from forty different
parameters such as acceleration, roll, pitch, and heading to recreate
a descent profile of the aircraft, including a display of information
that would have been available to the cockpit crew. Additionally,
information from National Weather Service ground radar facilities
... were analyzed by a weather reconstruction expert .... [Tihe
scenes were synchronized with the cockpit voice recorder for a dra-
matic recreation.
39
Note the "dramatic" nature of this re-enactment, even at the factual
end of the reconstruction/animation spectrum, showing that both fac-
tual and artistic aspects will be present in computer re-enactments
prepared for litigation.
Computer re-enactments are not only utilized in multi-million
dollar cases. Accidents in general are a popular subject for computer
re-enactments. For example, a computer model of a car accident al-
lows re-creation of both a bird's-eye view and a driver's perspective of
the event.4 °
35. Seltzer, supra note 6, at 361.
36. Seltzer, supra note 6, at 361.
37. Seltzer, supra note 6, at 361.
38. Biographical Introduction to Seltzer, supra note 6, at 361.
39. Fadely, supra note 4, at 898-99.
40. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 200-01.
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Other areas of civil litigation, such as patent law, have found ad-
ditional uses for computer re-enactments. Patent litigation often con-
cerns the differences between two inventions involving "subtle
technical disputes between parties. The differences are often difficult
to distinguish even for experts in the field. Computer [re-enactment]
is of great help in portraying the distinction or lack of distinction be-
tween the objects of dispute."'"
These examples are a sampling of the computer re-enactments
prepared for litigation and illustrate how computer re-enactments can
aid in the litigation process.
B. Technology of Computer Re-enactments
Two technological issues particularly affect the discovery of com-
puter-generated re-enactments. 42 First, understanding the basis of a
computer re-enactment's graphics helps determine where bias most
likely will be found. Second, knowing the analysis an opponent must
perform upon a computer re-enactment allows the proponent to un-
derstand how to rebut that bias effectively.
1. Creation of Computer Re-enactments
The final product of a computer re-enactment, the evidence ad-
mitted and displayed in the courtroom, is a series of images shown as
a moving picture on a television monitor. This re-enactment will
likely be recorded in the form of a videotape,43 or more recently, a
videodisc. 44 The information stored on either the tape or the disc is
the final product of a laborious, costly, and time consuming process.45
One of the originators of computer re-enactments in litigation de-
scribes the creation as a six-step process.
46
The first step is data collection. It includes the collection of any
pertinent data, including drawings, sketches and prints, police or ac-
cident reports, depositions of eyewitnesses, calculations and analy-
ses by experts, photographs, etc.
The second step is creating a storyboard .. .to describe the
motion that is to be animated.
41. Muir, supra note 2, at 365.
42. Two litigators with experience in the use of computer re-enactments in court have
outlined the technology that goes into the final visual product. Only a summary of the
general process is given here. See generally Muir, supra note 2; Sullivan, supra note 4.
43. Chernow, supra note 6, at 3.
44. Fadely, supra note 4, at 852-53.
45. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 200.
46. Muir, supra note 2, at 365-66.
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The third step is creating the computer models. Here the input
data describing the various objects in the animation are actually
built on the computer.
The fourth step is composing the motion script....
The fifth step is rendering. The computer takes all input data
S.. and renders, or calculates, a still frame containing the image.
Once all the frames are rendered.., the final step is recording those
47images....
A critical intermediate product, the computer model, is devel-
oped during the third step and involves entering the results of the in-
vestigation in the computer. This step is not a simple data-entry job,
however, as "[d]eveloping models is the most labor intensive step. It
requires the computer animator to assemble the data, including all
measurements and other descriptions of the objects in the animation
scene."48 The expert must build a three-dimensional mathematical
model in the computer corresponding to each of the objects to be dis-
played. She then positions this geometry for the individual models
within the re-enactment scene.49 This process creates a mathemati-
cally defined setting, with each of the "actors" at her starting
positions.
Strictly speaking, this three-dimensional model is not what is
shown in the courtroom. 50 Using another film analogy, the film
viewer does not see the live actors themselves when she watches the
movie. Rather, the viewer sees a series of pictures of the actors pro-
jected onto a flat screen. The actors themselves may look very differ-
ent in person than their images on the screen. A skilled
cinematographer will carefully select camera angles and make-up to
increase the appeal of some characters, while at the same time empha-
sizing the negative features and movements of others. The three-di-
mensional computer models are similar to the actors whose photos are
taken, and the flat graphical images of the three-dimensional com-
puter models are similar to the flat images of the actors on the
screen.
51
The flat graphical images of the computer models shown at trial
are created at the rendering step. Each image is a rendering of a cor-
responding three-dimensional computer scene into a two-dimensional
video image.52 Once a computer expert determines visual characteris-
47. Muir, supra note 2, at 365-66.
48. Muir, supra note 2, at 366.
49. Muir, supra note 2, at 366.
50. YVON GARDAN & MICHEL LUCAS, INTERACTIVE GRAPHICS IN CAD 7-8, 51
(1984).
51. See Muir, supra note 2, at 366.
52. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 200.
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tics and camera angles, the computer does the rest of the work. "This
process sometimes takes several hours on a microcomputer because it
must solve an enormous number of simultaneous equations.
'53
These two steps, modeling and rendering, are emphasized here
because they represent two distinct and critical phases of creating a
computer re-enactment. The mathematical models built in the com-
puter represent the factual, scientific basis of a computer re-enact-
ment. The renderings are the images which a skillful, biased animator
might set up to visually slant the presentation. The final product, the
video shown to the jury, reflects both the scientific and artistic influ-
ences. The problem, discussed below, is that these two aspects cannot
be separated easily from the tape, disk, or the television monitor.
2. Analyzing an Opponent's Computer Re-enactment
The rendering process is a one-way process. A three-dimensional
computer model can be rendered automatically, and thereby flat-
tened, to display it on a television monitor54 . A flat picture, however,
cannot be translated automatically into a three-dimensional model.55
Therefore, rendering translates the mathematical computer model
into a visual form which is more difficult to analyze.
Before rendering, the actual computer model allows precise mea-
surement and analysis. Stored on a computer, the geometric model's
nature allows tremendous amounts of useful information to be ex-
tracted with detail and precision. 6 Dimensions, clearance distances,
angles, along with other specialized technical data,57 are all readily
accessible. The three-dimensional model also reveals geometry which
is hidden from the two-dimensional perspective chosen for the final
video.
53. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 200 n: 26.
54. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 200 n. 26.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49 (describing the effort required to build
up a three-dimensional model). Theoretically, one might reverse the laborious process of
creating a flat picture from a three-dimensional model if an object is shown in multiple
views, but this reversal is not practical. On the simpler but still technically challenging
visual recognition of known objects, See generally David Casasent, Is What You See What
You Get?, BYTE 189 (Sept. 1992) (recommending development of optical data processing
for computer vision); J.D. Mosley, Sophisticated Hardware and Software Beget Efficient
Machine-Vision Systems, EDN 55 (Apr. 28, 1988) (using artificial intelligence to reduce
computer vision costs).
56. See, e.g., Anthony E. Majoros, Aircraft Design for Maintainability, Paper
Presented at AIAAIAHS/ASEE Aircraft Design and Operations Meeting, Seattle, Wash-
ington (July 31-Aug. 2, 1989).
57. See id. at 5.
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If the computer model were available to the opponent of the
computer re-enactment, that opponent could analyze its geometry and
compare it with the results of her own investigation of the facts. The
opponent could then determine inaccuracies and unfounded
prejudices within the computer re-enactment and point them out to
the jury.
The final product, the video to be shown at trial, is opaque to
such detailed analysis by opposing experts and counsel. Only limited
analysis can be done on the graphic image. As with any video, the
opponent can take measurements from the viewing monitor, or make
and measure prints of the individual re-enactment images. However,
the perspective chosen by the creator of the re-enactment limits these
measurements.58
The problem is that, by collapsing a three-dimensional model so
it can be shown on a flat screen, information is lost. As an example, a
car rendered in an overhead view can be measured for length, but not
height. When the same car is instead shown from an angle, and in
motion at varying speed, the accuracy of the measurements taken
from a video becomes questionable.
To allow an opponent to investigate the detailed analysis of a
computer re-enactment, the proponent of the re-enactment must
transfer the computer models to the opponent's computer system.59
The transfer is easiest to accomplish when both the creator of the re-
enactment and the recipient use the same computer system-both
hardware and software.6" Where different hardware or software are
used, the communication of the model becomes more difficult.61
However, models are commonly translated between computer sys-
tems by using model translation systems.6"
The technical ability to transfer these models is not the only po-
tential barrier to discovery of computer models. The computer model,
on which a computer animation is based, is built in anticipation of
litigation. The creators of an expensive computer re-enactment can
58. See generally Chernow, supra note 6 (describing dangers of slanted video
presentation).
59. GARDAN & LUCAS, supra note 50, at 114-15.
60. GARDAN & LUCAS, supra note 50, at 115.
61. GARDAN & LUCAS, supra note 50, at 115. One method for exchanging data be-
tween computer graphic systems is through the Initial Graphic Exchange Standard (herein-
after "IGES"). GARDAN & LUCAS, supra note 50, at 115. Although these model
translation systems are commonly used, they do have their limitations. E.g., John J.
Xenakis, 3-D Engineering - With CAD, Design Work Becomes Teamwork, INFORMATION
WEEK 22 (Feb. 25, 1991) (stating that IGES, and alternative standard DXF, are unable to
translate solid models).
62. GARDAN & LUCAS, supra note 50, at 115.
19941
therefore be expected to object to discovery of the fruit of their labor.
Later sections of this Note address these objections.
3. The Virtual Reality Concept
The last technical concept which may be helpful to understanding
computer re-enactments is virtual reality. Although the term has been
widely used, a precise definition is not yet generally accepted. 63 TWo
of the minimum requirements for virtual reality, however, are a three-
dimensional computer model or "scene", and some degree of interac-
tivity. 64 "By this definition, if you can use a mouse to fly through the
rendered model of a house on a computer screen, then you are dealing
with virtual reality. "65
The presentation of a videotaped computer re-enactment in a
courtroom does not include the interactive component of virtual real-
ity. A videotape can be played forward or backward, in fast or slow
motion, but the images cannot be modified by interaction with the
computer. A videotape of a computer re-enactment thus does not
give an opponent the opportunity to "explore" a virtual reality, by
modifying the scene or the motion of objects during trial.6 6 Put an-
other way, the opponent cannot get "behind the scenes" of the com-
puter re-enactment.
On the other hand, an opposing party with access to the three-
dimensional model of a computer re-enactment can interact with the
proponent's virtual reality and can bring that exploration to the court
via the opponent's own re-enactment.67 For example, the opposing
party could modify the viewing angle of the event to a more favorable
perspective. More importantly, it could change the scene itself.68 The
opposing party could change the colors of objects to create a more
positive impression for its position.69 Any disputed models (or their
movements) could be modified to show changes in the re-enactment.
In short, transfer of the three-dimensional models to the opposing
party allows that party to explore the re-enactment's virtual reality7"
63. Stephen Porter, Virtual Reality; Special Report: Virtual Reality, part 1, COMPUTER
GRAPHICS WORLD 42 (Mar. 1992).
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See David E. Edwards, Interactive Computer Graphics, AEROSPACE AMERICA 41
(Dec. 1992)
67. See generally Xenakis, supra note 61 (describing uses of computer models trans-
lated to different computer systems).
68. Id.
69. See Chernow, supra note 6, at 6.
70. See generally Edwards, supra note 66 (describing use of virtual reality as an analyt-
ical tool).
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from "behind the scenes," where artistic distortions are easier to
identify.
I
Analyzing Disclosure of Computer Re-enactments
Computer re-enactments are one of the many forms of computer-
based evidence.71 The wide group of computer-based evidence in-
cludes "any information whose most immediate source prior to its in-
troduction in the courtroom is a computer. '7 2  Computer-based
evidence has been divided into two types: 1) records stored on com-
puter, and 2) data generated by computer calculations.73 Business
records are typical of the first type of computer-based evidence.
Many businesses use electronic data storage, and the courts now regu-
larly admit these records as evidence in litigation.74
Computer re-enactments are within the second type of computer-
based data, evidence generated by computer calculations.75 The
courts treat computer-generated data differently from information
merely stored electronically.76 When evaluating its admissibility at
trial, the courts have treated computer-generated evidence with
stricter scrutiny than computer stored evidence.77
The stricter standard of admissibility for computer-generated evi-
dence shows a higher concern over this form of evidence. The con-
cern reflects the aspect of disclosure of computer re-enactments most
developed by the courts: The disclosure of a computer re-enactment
must be timely. Three cases, in particular, suggest this timeliness
requirement.
Unfortunately, the opinions of these three cases do not provide
much depth of analysis to help guide future decisions. In a criminal
71. The broad classification of all evidence derived from computers and data process-
ing equipment is sometimes referred to as computer-generated evidence. See, e.g., Mur-
phy, supra note 8, at 146; Fadely, supra note 4, at 840-41. The term computer evidence is
used here to clarify that both stored data and data generated by computer calculations is
included within the classification.
72. Forward to Law and Technology Symposium: Coping with Computer-Generated
Evidence in Litigation, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 545, 545 (1976).
73. Daniel A. Bronstein & Daniel Engelberg, A Preliminary Assessment of the Recep-
tion of Computer Evidence: Report of the Computer Evidence Survey Project, 21
JURIMETRICS J. 329, 332 (1981).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1157 (1974). See also Richard M. Long, The Discovery and Use of Computerized
Information: An Examination of Current Approaches, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 405 (1986).
75. See Muir, supra note 2, at 365-66.
76. Bronstein & Engelberg, supra note 73, at 322.
77. Bronstein & Engelberg, supra note 73, at 322.
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trial, People v. McHugh,78 a defendant sought to introduce a computer
re-enactment of an auto accident. The trial court admitted the re-en-
actment, but required the defendant's attorney turn over a copy of the
computer program to the prosecution to eliminate delay at trial.79 In
another case, Baugh v. Gulf Air Transport,8" the trial judge refused to
allow an accident re-construction expert to use a computer re-enact-
ment. The refusal was based on the defendant's failure to warn the
plaintiff that the defendant's expert would use a computer re-enact-
ment at trial.8 Similarly, in Douglass v. Delta Air Lines8" the late
designation of an expert witness prevented the defendant in a wrong-
ful death action from presenting a re-enactment.83 These three cases
indicate that timely disclosure is an important factor in determining
the admissibility of a computer re-enactment. As these opinions give
little analysis, however, the underlying policy must be determined
from their context.
In all three cases, the plaintiffs sought to introduce the computer
re-enactment in conjunction with expert witness testimony. "[A]n ex-
pert in the field of accident investigation and reconstruction"
presented the auto accident re-enactment in McHugh.84 The Baugh
auto collision re-enactment similarly had been prepared for presenta-
tion by "a mechanical engineer offered by plaintiff as an accident re-
construction expert."85 Finally, the airline defendant in Douglass
offered a wind field re-enactment "along with the corresponding testi-
mony from the computer expert who created the model."86 In all
three cases, the courts required that the opponent be given time to
prepare a response to the expert witness using a computer re-
enactment.
As in these three cases, experts often present the computer re-
enactments at trial. It is therefore reasonable to apply the policy be-
hind disclosure of expert witnesses to the disclosure of computer re-
enactments. An advisory committee stated the policy underlying the
current rules governing discovery of experts who will be called as wit-
78. 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1984).
79. Id. at 722-23.
80. 526 So. 2d 1239 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
81. Id. at 1240-41. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision based on the
failure to proffer the evidence.
82. 709 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
83. Id. at 759 n.3.
84. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
85. Baugh, 526 So. 2d at 1240.
86. Douglass, 709 F. Supp. at 759.
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nesses at trial when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted:
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance
preparation. The lawyer even with the help of his own experts fre-
quently cannot anticipate the particular approach his adversary's
expert will take or the data on which he will base his judgment on
the stand. A California study of discovery ... notes that the only
substitute for discovery of experts valuation materials is "lengthy-
and often fruitless-cross-examination".... Similarly, effective re-
buttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the
other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery,
then the narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which dis-
covery normally produces are frustrated.87
McHugh, Baugh, and Douglass can be interpreted as expert wit-
ness cases. These three cases, along with the advisory committee
notes, indicate a requirement of timely disclosure for computer re-
enactments. This requirement would apply regardless of whether the
testimony is of a computer expert, as in Douglass, or some other tech-
nical specialist who uses the computer re-enactment to illustrate his
expert opinion, as in McHugh and Baugh. The timeliness requirement
has two justifications: first, it enables an opponent to cross-examine
the presenting expert efficiently; and second, it allows preparation of
an effective rebuttal.
These policies of allowing cross-examination and rebuttal also af-
fect other aspects of discovery. What can the opponent of a computer
re-enactment require its proponent to disclose? This question has not
yet been answered in the courts. Therefore, it is necessary to look at
what courts have done with other forms of computer evidence.
A. Trends in the Discovery of Other Forms of Computer Evidence
There are no reported cases to date on the extent of discovery
allowed for computer re-enactments. Issues concerning requests for
discovery of other computer evidence, however, have matured into
established movements. Unfortunately, the trends in related technol-
ogies are not uniform. Two of the distinct trends that have emerged
are 1) liberal discovery of the scientific basis of computer simulations,
and 2) protection from discovery of computer litigation support sys-
tems. This section reviews the development of these two trends in the
courts. The following section uses these cases as examples of the
court's analysis in applying the federal rules governing discovery.
87. FED. R. Civ* P. 26(b)(4)(A) advisory committee's note (1970 Amendment) (cita-
tions omitted).
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1. Broadening Discovery of Computer Simulations
The courts have addressed several issues key to the discovery of
computer re-enactments in connection with the discovery of expert
computer simulations. "Simulations ... mathematically predict how a
phenomenon has or will occur based on assumptions. ' 88 In other
words, simulations "accept data which is representative of actual
events, manipulate this data according to sets of rules which represent
how the real world works, and present results which are an approxi-
mation of the actual results."8 9
Simulations can be one of the components of a computer re-en-
actment. If an event is simulated, and if the output from the computer
is an animated graphical image, then simulation has been used to cre-
ate a computer re-enactment.90 Simulations, however, can produce
other forms of output as well. The courts have addressed discovery of
simulations producing graphs, tables of data, and numerical estimates.
An early case, Perma Research & Developement v. Singer Co.,91
allowed a narrow, restricted disclosure of the computations and pro-
gramming underlying a computer simulation. Plaintiffs brought a
breach of contract action against Singer Co., which had suspended
marketing of a new brake. The contract called for Singer to use its
best efforts to perfect an anti-skid brake design.92 Perma's expert wit-
nesses had developed a computer simulation of the patented brake.
Notwithstanding Perma's refusal to disclose the details of the simula-
tion to Singer,9" the trial judge allowed two of Perma's expert wit-
nesses to testify based almost entirely upon the simulation.94 The
Second Circuit affirmed, stating that
it might have been better practice for opposing counsel to arrange
for the delivery of all details of the underlying data and theorems
employed in these simulations in advance of trial .... [Nonetheless,
t]he trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the experts
to testify as to this particular basis for their conclusion that the
Perma device was indeed perfectible.
95
More recently, the courts and commentators have pushed for
more expansive discovery to allow an opponent the opportunity to
88. Aldous, supra note 1, at 51.
89. Murphy, supra note 8, at 147.
90. See Murphy, supra note 8, at 147.
91. 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
92. Id. at 113.
93. Id. at 124 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 124, 115.
95. Id. at 115.
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expose the weaknesses of computer-generated data.96 Lin v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp,97 a wrongful death suit brought after a DC-10 air-
liner crashed near Chicago, demonstrates this trend toward broader
discovery.
In Lin, the airplane manufacturer and airline defendants ap-
pealed from an award of over $7,000,000 to Dr. Lin's survivors.98
Computer-generated estimates of Dr. Lin's estimated future income,
prepared by the plaintiffs' expert witness, were admitted at trial. The
Second Circuit ordered a retrial, based in part on the fact that "the
defendants never had an opportunity in pretrial discovery to examine
his computer methodology and thus were impaired in conducting an
effective cross-examination." 99 As the court pointed out, "[t]his case
• . . clearly demonstrates the importance of ensuring that adequate
discovery of experts takes place prior to the start of trial."' 00
While the Perma and Lin courts may have reached different re-
sults, they expressed the discovery policies consistently. Although the
Perma court did not consider the restricted discovery to be an abuse
of discretion, it did recognize that the basis of calculations performed
by expert witnesses should be disclosed to the opposing party.10 1 The
Lin court went further, requiring detailed discovery to allow for effec-
tive cross-examine of an expert witness who uses a computer simula-
tion.10 2 The courts have recognized that during trial it is not realistic
to expect counsel to extract the basis of a complex computer simula-
tion, to review the computer's programming, and to then demonstrate
any flaws. "The courts [now] believe that by allowing extensive dis-
covery, the opponent can become familiar with the simulation and de-
velop a line of questioning and possible refutation."'0 3
2. Protection of Computer Litigation Support Systems
Commentators have not advocated expanded discovery in all ar-
eas of computer evidence. In fact, they generally have sought protec-
96. See generally Aldous, supra note 1; See also Fadely, supra note 4, at 894-96; Robert
Garcia, "Garbage In, Gospel Out": Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability, and the Con-
stitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043.
97. Id. at 48 n.3.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 48.
100. 742 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1984).
101. See supra text accompanying note 95.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100. See generally California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (describing cross-examination as the greatest legal engine ever in-
vented for the discovery of truth).
103. Murphy, supra note 8, at 159.
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tion from discovery for computerized litigation support systems. °4
"A computer [litigation] support system is simply a record of poten-
tially relevant information developed in anticipation of litigation and
stored in a computer. The computer allows lawyers quickly and effi-
ciently to identify needed documents so that they may be retrieved
out of voluminous files."'0 5 To date, the courts appear to have uni-
formly granted properly requested protection for computer litigation
support services against discovery.
1 6
An example of the protection given to computerized litigation
support systems is In re IBM Peripherals.°7 The plaintiff in that anti-
trust suit sought to gain access to the litigation support system devel-
oped by IBM." 8 The plaintiff's alternative was a manual review of
several million pages of documents, which was expected to take over
six months to complete. 0 9 Nonetheless, the court refused to compel
IBM to give the plaintiffs access to IBM's computerized litigation sup-
port system.110
IBM successfully argued that the plaintiffs were seeking a "free
ride" in lieu of creating their own computer support system."' The
policy behind this argument is that each side should do its own work.
This policy, however, is in conflict with the enabling of cross-examina-
tion and rebuttal. The IBM Peripherals holding indicates that even
when some hardship exists for the opposing party, computer litigation
support systems are protected.
The protection of computer litigation support services contrasts
sharply with the trend requiring disclosure of computer simulations.
Computer litigation support systems are distinguishable from com-
puter simulations, however. One distinction is that computer simula-
tions are presented as evidence in connection with expert testimony,
while litigation support systems are used behind the scenes by attor-
neys to accumulate data. Another distinction is that litigation support
services are primarily indices of other evidence which has been stored
104. Joseph M. Howie, Jr., Preserving the Attorney Work Product Status for Litigation-
Support Databases, in WINNING WITH COMPUTERS, supra note 2, at 211; Stephen J.
Krigbaum, Computerized Litigation Support Systems and the Attorney Work Product Doc-
trine: The Need for Court Support Against Discovery, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 281 (1983).
105. Krigbaum, supra note 104, at 284-85.
106. Id. at 283 (citing Traylor v. Marine Corp., 328 F. Supp 382 (E.D. Wis. 1970)); In re
IBM Peripherals, 5 Comp.L. Serv. 878 (N.D. Cal. 1975); In re National Union Electric v.
Matsushita Electric, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 414 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
107. 5 Comp. L. Serv. 878 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
108. Id.
109. Krigbaum, supra note 104, at 296.
110. IBM Peripherals, 5 Comp. L. Serv. at 878.
111. Id.
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on the computer. In contrast, computer simulations (like computer
re-enactments) generate evidence. Because courts consider com-
puter-generated evidence suspect, 1 2 it is reasonable to allow an oppo-
nent greater latitude in discovery.
These distinctions alone are insufficient to indicate whether in fu-
ture computer re-enactment cases courts will allow broad discovery as
in simulations, or whether they will protect the re-enactments like liti-
gation support systems. A review of how the courts approach specific
discovery requests is therefore required. Computer litigation support
services are analyzed under a different framework than computer sim-
ulations. Both analytical frameworks are largely imposed by codified
rules. Applying the federal rules to these two forms of computer evi-
dence gives an additional indication of the analysis courts will apply to
disclosure of computer re-enactments.
B. Discovery of Computer Evidence under the Federal Rules
Two sets of rules apply to the discovery of computer re-enact-
ments within the federal courts. Federal Rule of Evidence 705 (FRE
705) addresses the disclosure of the facts or data underlying an expert
witness' opinion given at trial. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4) (FRCP 26(b)(4)) governs the scope of discovery of expert
witnesses. Cases interpreting these rules, as well as the cases from
which the rules have been drawn, help to explain how they apply to
computer re-enactments.
1. Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
FRE 705 generally authorizes an expert to give opinion testimony
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts and data upon which
that opinion is based." 3 The rule limits this privilege, however, by
stating that the underlying facts or data "may" be disclosed on cross-
examination. 1 4 The advisory committee explained that the choice
(implied by "may") belongs to the expert's opponent. The opponent
can choose "to bring out any facts or data ...unfavorable to the
opinion. . . . [This] assumes that the cross-examiner has advance
knowledge which is essential for effective cross-examination.""' 5 This
112. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
113. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 705 states that an "expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required
to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
114. Id.
115. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's note (1970 Amendment).
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recognizes that access to advance knowledge of an expert's testimony
is a prerequisite to an effective cross-examination.
FRE 705 explicitly gives the court the discretion to order prior
disclosure of the basis of an expert's opinion. 116 The advisory commit-
tee implicitly assumed the judge would consider the ability to cross-
examine an expert in determining whether to order prior disclosure of
the basis of an expert's opinion.
1 7
2. Discovery of the Basis of Opinion of an Expert Witness
"If a party expects to call an expert for trial testimony... Rule
26(b)(4) allows the discovery of a well-defined spectrum of informa-
tion.""' 8 Rule 26 (b)(4)(A)(i) states:
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each party whom the other party expects to call as an ex-
pert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert
is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of
the grounds for each opinion.
19
"The case law does not specifically define what constitutes a suffi-
cient summary, but it indicates that a skeletal summary of the grounds
relied upon will be sufficient to meet the discovery requirements of
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)."' 120 The rule also restricts the form of discovery by
right to "interrogatories.' 121 The courts have therefore indicated that
FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i) cannot be used to compel production of the doc-
uments which comprise the basis of an expert's opinion. 122 The policy
behind these restrictions is the fear that one side "will benefit unduly
from the other's better preparation."' 23
Applying FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i) in isolation, discovery by right of
a computer re-enactment to be presented at trial appears limited.
24
The identity of the re-enactment expert must be given, and the expert
must be identified as a computer re-enactment expert. 25 In addition,
the requirement to state the facts and opinions to which the expert is
to testify at least compels a re-enactment's proponent to deliver a
116. FED. R. EVID. 705.
117. See supra text accompanying note 115.
118. Jan W. Henkel & 0. Lee Reed, Work Product Privilege and Discovery of Expert
Testimony: Resolving the Conflict Between Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and
26(b)(4), 38 DEF. L.J. 565, 571 (1989).
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
120. Henkel & Reed, supra note 118, at 572-73.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
122. Henkel & Reed, supra note 118, at 572-73.
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) advisory committee's notes (1970 Amendment).
124. See Henkel & Reed, supra note 118, at 572-73; Aldous, supra note 1, at 63-64.
125. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
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copy of the final video to the opponent.'26 The basis for the re-enact-
ment, however, need only be summarized.'
The party that creates a computer re-enactment will attempt to
avoid disclosing its computer models. Toward that end, it might char-
acterize the three-dimensional computer models as a protected "docu-
ment" upon which an expert's opinion is based. This characterization
could protect the detailed geometry of the computer models underly-
ing a computer re-enactment from discovery under FRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(i).
Although discovery by right is limited under FRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(i), another means for discovery is available to the oppo-
nent of a computer re-enactment. Under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii),
"[u]pon motion, the court may order further discovery by other
means, subject to" limitations and fee requirements the court deems
appropriate.12 8 The extent of discovery allowed, and the showing to
be made by the moving party, are left entirely to the discretion of the
court.
12 9
The court, however, should rely on a balancing of the competing
policies behind the rules in exercising its discretion. The assumption
behind FRE 705 is that the court will enable an opponent to cross-
examine the expert witness by allowing discovery. 130 Both FRE 705
and FRCP 26(b)(4) provide for discretionary discovery so that when
the policy of enabling cross-examination conflicts with the policy of
each party performing its own work, the court can still order sufficient
disclosure for effective cross-examination. Failure of the court to con-
sider these policies should be considered an abuse of its discretion.
131
The courts have reconciled the conflict between these policies for
computer simulations. As described above, the court in Perma Re-
search & Development v. Singer Co. 132 recognized that the risk of lim-
iting discovery of the computer simulation was that the opposing side
could not effectively cross-examine the presenting expert. Nonethe-
less, the court stated: "[t]he trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
allowing the experts to testify .... [W]e hold that Singer has not
shown that it did not have an adequate basis on which to cross-ex-
126. See People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1984) (requiring defendant to turn over
a copy of the "computer program" of an auto accident computer re-enactment to the dis-
trict attorney).
127. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii), 26(b)(4)(C)
129. Aldous, supra note 1, at 64.
130. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
131. See Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984).
132. 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
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amine plaintiff's experts."' 33 This decision has not been widely
followed.'34
Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 35 reflects the increasing sensi-
tivity of the courts to the challenges of cross-examining computer ex-
pert testimony without sufficient disclosure. 36 Another case which
reflects this sensitivity is City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illumi-
nating Co., 137 a federal district court case from Ohio. The Cleveland
court upheld a ruling in favor of a motion to compel pretrial produc-
tion in an antitrust suit. The information sought included the data and
calculations underlying an expert witness's computer simulation.1
38
Certainly, where, as here, the expert reports are predicated upon
complex data, calculations and computer simulations which are
neither discernible nor deducible from the written reports them-
selves, disclosure thereof is essential to the facilitation of 'effective
and efficient examination of these experts at trial."
139
The district court specifically compelled the production of the com-
puter data and programs used in the simulation. 4 °
The reasons given by the Cleveland court for compelling disclo-
sure are as valid for computer re-enactments as they are for computer
simulations. Complex data, calculations, and even simulations them-
selves are used to create computer re-enactments. The final video-
tape, similar to the written report in Cleveland, does not reveal the
required information for effective cross-examination. 41 Moreover,
the computer re-enactment will be shown in a more visually persua-
sive format than the results of other simulations. 42 Therefore, com-
plete disclosure of the data and calculations underlying a computer re-
enactment is necessary to facilitate an effective and efficient cross-ex-
amination of the presenting expert.
One issue remains open, however. Will the courts find that the
policy favoring each side doing its own work overcome this need for
disclosure? Answering this question requires analysis of the rule used
to protect computer litigation support services, the work product
doctrine.
133. Id. at 115.
134. See Fadely, supra note 4, at 895; see also Murphy, supra note 8, at 152; see generally
Aldous, supra note 1.
135. 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984).
136. Id. at 48.
137. 538 F. Supp 1257 (N.D. Ohio, E.D. 1980).
138. Id. at 1266.
139. Id. at 1267 (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 1266.
141. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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3. Work Product Protection
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) (FRCP 26(b)(3)), which
contains the work product doctrine, may protect material prepared by
an attorney or her agent. FRCP 26(b)(3) provides this qualified im-
munity from discovery to materials which meet certain require-
ments, 43 and has been advanced to prevent disclosure of computer
litigation support services.144 However, FRCP 26(b)(3) does not pro-
tect the basis of an expert witness opinion from discovery.' 45
The work product doctrine originated from the landmark case of
Hickman v. Taylor,'4 6 a wrongful death action arising from the sinking
of a tugboat. 47 The counsel for the defendant tugboat owners refused
to disclose his notes and memoranda of interviews with surviving crew
members. 48 The Supreme Court agreed that the thoughts and mental
impressions of an attorney have a qualified immunity from discov-
ery. 4 9 The Court stated that "the general policy against invading the
privacy of an attorney's course of preparation is . . . well recognized
and . . .essential to an orderly working of our system of legal
procedure."' 50
The doctrine was codified as FRCP 26(b)(3) in 1970,151 and pro-
tects materials which meet three requirements. Protection is available
only for 1) "documents and tangible things" '52 which are 2)"prepared
in anticipation of litigation"' 53 3) "by or for another party or by or for
that other party's representative."' 54 The advisory committee's notes
explain that "[t]he courts have steadfastly safeguarded against disclo-
sure of lawyers' mental impressions and legal theories, as well as
mental impressions and subjective evaluations of investigators and
claim-agents.'
55
Application of FRCP 26(b)(3) to protect computer litigation sup-
port systems is fairly straightforward. An amendment to the rules ex-
plicitly included data compilations within the first requirement of
143. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3); Henkel & Reed, supra note 118, at 568-69.
144. Howie, supra note 104; Krigbaum, supra note 104.
145. Henkel & Reed, supra note 118, at 588.
146. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
147. Id. at 498.
148. Id. at 498-99.
149. Id. at 514.
150. Id. at 512.




155. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's notes (1970 Amendment).
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"documents and tangible things."' 56 Selecting documents and incor-
porating them into a database fulfills the second requirement, so long
as the work (preparation) is done in anticipation of litigation.'57 Fi-
nally, the lawyer, computer experts, and other agents of the party will
prepare the computer litigation support system, meeting the third re-
quirement.158 The intimate involvement of the attorney in assembling
these document databases creates a risk that discovery would reveal
the attorney's trial strategy. 159 Computerized litigation support sys-
tems therefore get the same level of qualified protection as traditional
manual litigation systems. 6 °
Although In re IBM Peripherals161 did not mention FRCP
26(b)(3), the court was protecting IBM's work product. The court
specifically noted that IBM's counsel prepared the protected com-
puter litigation support system solely for litigation.' 62 Most impor-
tantly, the district court found that the computer litigation support
system reflected the attorney's "mental impressions, theories, and
thought processes."' 63
FRCP 26(b)(3) might arguably be a barrier to the discovery of
the details underlying a computer re-enactment. Computer re-enact-
ments, like computer litigation support systems, can be characterized
as data compilations, prepared for litigation, which are made by a rep-
resentative of the party. The party introducing a computer re-enact-
ment could in effect claim that its opponent is free to create their own
re-enactment-to do its own work. However, FRCP 26(b)(3) and (4)
exclude the specialized work product of expert witnesses from work
product protection.'
64
The first sentence of FRCP 26(b)(3) clearly states that work
product protection is "[s]ubject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)
of this rule.' 165 FRCP 26(b)(4) in turn specifically deals with the dis-
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 34; Krigbaum, supra note 104, at 289.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see Krigbaum, supra note 104, at 289-91.
158. Id. at 292.
159. Id. at 306.
160. In re IBM Peripherals, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 878 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Howie,
supra note 103, at 211.
161. 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 878.
162. Id. at 879.
163. Id.
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), (4).
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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closure relating to experts. 66 The rules concerning expert witness dis-
closure therefore supersede the work product doctrine. 67
The courts have not applied the work product doctrine to limit
disclosure of the basis of computer simulations, apparently because
simulations are normally used in connection with the testimony of an
expert witness. Similarly, an expert witness prepares computer re-en-
actments in anticipation of use with the expert's testimony at trial.
Since the rules governing disclosure of expert witnesses take prece-
dence, the work product doctrine should not prevent disclosure relat-
ing to a computer re-enactment. The doctrine is significant, however,
as an indication of the strength of the policy against granting a free
ride to the opposition by means of the rules of discovery.
C. Discovery of Videotaped Re-enactments
The few cases dealing with the discovery of computer evidence
are not the only source of analysis available to courts facing this novel
area. Cases involving media outside computer evidence can also help
shed light on the scope of discovery of computer re-enactments. The
strong parallels between computer re-enactments and videotaped re-
enactments, for example, suggest that lessons learned by the courts in
dealing with videotapes may be helpful.
Videotapes are both a component of computer re-enactments and
an analogous medium in their own right. Videotaped re-enactments
are physical re-creations of an event filmed by the use of a video re-
corder. "In-court videotapes provoke diverse reactions. Some admire
their ability to clarify complex matters and make them understandable
by the average juror or judge .... Other observers, however,... see
possible distortion in presenting one side's position in an unfair but
persuasive form."' 6 s These issues are common to both computer re-
enactments and videotaped re-enactments.
A videotape re-enactment was used in Hale v. Firestone Tire,'69 a
product liability action brought after the explosion of a truck tire
rim.170 The tape depicts a mannequin crouched as if filling a tire with
air. "The tire then explodes, striking the mannequin and hurling it
approximately ten feet in a cloud of smoke. The explosion is repeated
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); see also supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
167. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Applicability of Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-
Testifying Experts: Reestablishing the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and
the Work Product Protection, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 19 (1990). But see Henkel & Reed, supra
note 117.
168. Chernow, supra note 6, at 4.
169. 820 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1987).
170. Id. at 931.
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two more times and concludes with a closeup shot of the mannequin's
face.' 171 The Eighth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting use of the tape. 72 The court reasoned that
the opponent of the video had the opportunity to fully cross-examine
on the making of the video. 73
Judge Chernow of the Los Angeles County Superior Court criti-
cized the Hale case: "I would have been especially dubious about the
tire rim tape: The tire in the video was different from the tire in the
accident, and the cameraman needed six takes to get the explosion
offered at trial.' 1 74 Judge Chernow provided a series of guidelines for
dealing with use of videotapes in the courtroom. These guidelines
were presented after discussion of both videotaped and computer re-
enactments.
Judge Chernow's includes several recommendations:
[R]equire disclosure of a tape a minimum time before trial; preserve
and require the production of outtakes; give all parties a chance to
be present at the taping of any demonstration.., require the disclo-
sure of key assumptions of an animated video ... and.., prohibit
the audio track from being played to the jury, thereby requiring live
narration.'
75
Some of these discretionary expansions of the discovery of video-
tapes apply to both computer and physical re-enactments. 76 Courts
have required timely disclosure, for example, before ruling a com-
puter re-enactment admissible. 77 Other recommendations were in-
tended for videotapes only: Allowing the presence of both parties at
the demonstration was clearly intended for videotaped re-enactments.
It is not practical for a party to be present at the time-consuming crea-
tion of a computer re-enactment. Strictly parallel provisions between
the two media are therefore not feasible.
An analogous procedure, however, could effectively "give all par-
ties a chance to be present at the taping' 17 of a computer re-enact-
ment. The court, under the discretionary discovery of FRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(ii), could require the proponent of a computer re-enact-
ment to disclose the computer model underlying the computer re-en-
actment. By means of virtual reality, a, computer re-enactment's
171. Id. The case shows how far advocates will go when the courts allow them to pres-
ent slanted visual evidence.
172. Id. at 932.
173. Id.
174. Chernow, supra note 6, at 4.
175. Chernow, supra note 6, at 56.
176. Chernow, supra note 6, at 56.
177. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
178. See supra text accompanying note 175.
HASTINGS COMMfENT L.J. [Vol. 16:691
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF COMPUTER RE-ENACTMENTS
opponent could then explore, and thereby be present, at the three-
dimensional scene of a computer re-enactment. The policy behind al-
lowing an opposing party to be present at a videotaped re-enactment
is to prevent the admission of videotapes showing unrealistic experi-
ments at trial. An opposing party who was present at the taping
would also be able to cross-examine the presenting witness on any
questionable aspects observed at the re-enactment. Similarly, a party
given the computer model basis of a computer re-enactment would be




Allowing broad discovery of computer re-enactments is a rational
extension of the trend toward expanding discovery of computer-gen-
erated evidence in general. The truth-seeking function of cross-exam-
ination is best served by an opponent who has detailed knowledge of
the underlying data and computations. Courts should generally com-
pel the proponent of a computer re-enactment, under the discretion-
ary disclosure provided for in FRCP 26(b)(4)(ii), to disclose the
computer models used to create a computer re-enactment.
A party who receives the computer models of an opponents'
computer re-enactment can perform a detailed audit of the accuracy
of the factual basis of the re-enactment. David Muir, a pioneer in the
use of computer re-enactments in litigation, recognized the impor-
tance (even to the proponent) of checking these models. "Qualifica-
tion of the input data is both the most important and the most
vulnerable step .... [T]he accuracy of the input data and the rele-
vance and validity of the assumptions are key to the qualification of
not only any animation, but also any expert's testimony.' '1 79 Mr.
Muir, however, recommends that a "disinterested, qualified party or
another animator" should perform an audit for the creating party. 8s
Mr. Muir's suggestion provides a means for a conscientious ex-
pert to validate that the models accurately reflect the creating party's
version of the facts. However, an internal audit of the computer
model does nothing to overcome artistic distortions. Nor does an in-
ternal audit bring to light disputable facts, which may not be readily
visible from the final re-enactment video.
179. Muir, supra note 2, at 367.
180. Muir, supra note 2, at 367.
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However, disclosure of the computer model to the opponent of
the re-enactment would enable that opponent to perform the audit
within our adversarial trial system. The virtual reality concept, de-
scribed above, may help to clarify the benefit of disclosure of the
three-dimensional models. Requiring the creator of a computer re-
enactment to transfer the underlying computer models exposes that
re-enactment's virtual reality to the opponent. Exposing a computer
re-enactment's opponent to the virtual reality of the depicted event
allows a thorough questioning of both the technical basis and discov-
ery of any visual bias.
A party who receives these complete models, however, also has a
head start on creating its own computer re-enactment. The party has
the benefit of the re-enactment's investigation and the tedious com-
puter model building work. It can modify the models, change the mo-
tion script, and render images to produce its own computer re-
enactment. This derivative re-enactment will, of course, show the
event in a more favorable light for the opponent's side. The recipient
of completed three-dimensional computer models thus has some ben-
efit from the other party's work.
This broad discovery of the basis of a computer re-enactment
therefore conflicts with the policy that each side should perform its
own work. Where the need to allow cross-examination does not over-
ride this policy, it remains a valid reason to limit disclosure. For this
reason, situations may arise in which the creator of a computer re-
enactment should not be compelled to provide an equally capable op-
ponent with a complete computer re-enactment "kit."
It is possible to transfer less than the complete computer
model.' 8' Simplified models, consisting of lines and points only, could
be disclosed. A computer re-enactment's opponent could still use
such a model to audit geometry, but would be faced with a considera-
ble amount of work to create surfaced or solid models from which to
render an opposing computer re-enactment.
Disclosure of the computer re-enactment could thus be limited at
the discretion of the court. In ideal circumstances-where both sides
have a complete set of the factual and scientific basis of the computer
re-enactment's foundation, and where visual bias is not a concern-
discovery of an opponent's complete computer model may not be jus-
tified. At the other extreme, in a criminal prosecution of an indigent
defendant, allowing the court-appointed defense to respond to a com-
181. See generally supra note 61.
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puter re-enactment by utilizing the prosecution's work should not
raise serious policy concerns.
The presumption, however, should be for disclosure of the com-
plete model. The reason for this recommendation is the cost of com-
puter re-enactments. The decision by one party in litigation to utilize
a computer re-enactment has substantial financial implications for
both parties. A typical computer re-enactment costs about $25,000; a
complex model can run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 82
Litigators (and their clients) are willing to fund such work because
they believe computer re-enactments will have a considerable effect
on the jury. Only one side is involved in the decision to "up the ante"
by using such expensive methods; the opposing party may not be in a
financial position to respond in kind. The expense of this technology
therefore weakens the argument that the other side can always pre-
pare its own re-enactment, and supports the disclosure of the com-
plete computer models.
Of course any derivative computer re-enactment made from an
opponent's original would be subject to the same discovery. The
thought of the resulting trial, in which two opposing accident re-con-
struction experts each present a computer re-enactment and attack
the other's work, may sound strange. The current reality of a trial in
which only one side presents a computer re-enactment, which the
other side may be unable to counteract, should seem stranger still.
In summary, a computer re-enactment is a powerful tool for liti-
gation. The proponent of such a tool should be prepared to provide
complete disclosure of the basis of the re-enactment. 183 The courts
should presume that discovery of the heart of the re-enactment, the
three-dimensional computer model, is required to allow an effective
cross-examination of the expert witness. Disclosure of computer
models should be limited only after a showing by the re-enactment's
proponent that: 1) both sides have access to the complete factual and
scientific basis of the re-enactment; 2) visual bias is of minimal con-
cern; and 3) the parties are in comparable financial positions. Courts
could then limit discovery of models to lines and points, enabling the
182. See supra note 61, at 368.
183. Data format will depend on the computer systems involved, but the following are
general recommendations: Several individual data tapes might be required to transmit a
re-enactment scene. Each object portrayed in the re-enactment should be isolated in its
own computer file to keep the computer file size manageable. A master scene file should
be prepared with the starting location and orientation of each object indicated by a set of
coordinate axes. Finally, the motion of objects within the scene should be represented by
centerline motion paths, with additional coordinate axes showing each object's position
and orientation at a number of discrete intervals in time.
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opponent to audit the geometry, but requiring substantial work to cre-
ate an opposing computer re-enactment.
V
Conclusion
The courts will have to consider discovery motions for computer
re-enactments more often as they gain popularity as a courtroom tool.
The advantage of computer re-enactments is their ability to present a
large amount of complex data in a visual, understandable way. The
courts, however, need to provide the opposing party the information
required to evaluate the displayed data.
The courts have recently addressed related discovery issues re-
garding computer simulations, computer litigation support systems,
and videotaped re-enactments. Cases dealing with these related dis-
covery issues help to determine which policy considerations are
implicated.
The federal rules also provide a framework for analyzing com-
puter re-enactment discovery requests, but the result is that disclosure
is left largely to the court's discretion. Exercising that discretion
means balancing the competing policies of allowing effective cross-ex-
amination, and having each party do its own work. Where these two
policies conflict, the courts must assure that cross-examination has pri-
ority over work product for the adversarial system to function
effectively.
The best way to evaluate a computer re-enactment is to analyze
the computer models from which it is created. The models should be
accessible through the discovery process. An additional result of dis-
closing these models is that an alternative computer re-enactment can
be made by the opposing party. Generally this solution addresses
concerns over the influence of computer re-enactments; each side
could present a re-enactment, and each would highlight any inaccura-
cies of the opponent's re-enactment. In rare circumstances, full dis-
closure of the models may be undesirable. Where both sides have the
data and financial resources to create a computer re-enactment inde-
pendently, and where visual bias is not a concern, courts may limit the
disclosure.
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